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Brouwer’s Real Thesis on Bars
Wim Veldman
Radboud University Nijmegen
SW. . . . NÜn dà ¢toi oÎk êi yeuds däxa, ¢  tis oÚden, oÙìn te m
eÊdènai. KaÈ toÔtwn pìtera aÉr¨i?
JEAI. A^poron aÑre	n protjhs, Â S¸krates.
SOC. . . .But as the matter now stands, either there is no such thing as
false judgement; or a man may not know what he knows. Which do you
choose?
THEAET. You are offering me an impossible choice, Socrates.
Plato, Theaetetus 196c
Abstract: L.E.J. Brouwer made a mistake in the formulation of his famous
bar theorem, as was pointed out by S.C. Kleene. By repeating this mistake
several times, Brouwer has caused confusion. We consider the assumption
underlying his bar theorem, calling it Brouwer’s Thesis. This assumption is not
refuted by Kleene’s example and we use it to obtain a conclusion different from
Brouwer’s. Thus we come to support a view first expressed and defended by
E. Martino and P. Giaretta in [Martino 1981]. We also indicate that Brouwer’s
Thesis has many more applications than Brouwer dreamt of.
Philosophia Scientiæ, Cahier spécial 6, 2006, 21–42.
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1 Brouwer’s Basic Assumption on Bars and
its Consequences
We let N be the set of the natural numbers 0, 1, 2, . . . and use variables
m,n for elements of this set. We let Baire space N be the set of all inﬁnite
sequences of natural numbers and use variables α, β, . . . for elements
of this set. We consider an inﬁnite sequence of natural numbers as a
function from N to N. For every α in N , for every n in N, we denote the
value of the function α in the argument n by α(n).
Like the sequence 0, 1, 2, . . . of the natural numbers itself, every in-
ﬁnite sequence α = α(0), α(1), α(2), . . . of natural numbers is a growing
and incomplete object, that is always under construction and never ﬁ-
nished. It might be better to call inﬁnite sequences projects rather than
objects.
The sequence with the constant value 0 and the decimal expansion
of π are examples of inﬁnite sequences of natural numbers but the in-
tuitionistic mathematician does not expect or require that every inﬁnite
sequence of natural numbers is given by a ﬁnite description or an algo-
rithm that determines in advance what the values of the sequence will
be. He admits the possibility of sequences α = α(0), α(1), α(2), . . . that
are created step-by-step and thus, in some sense, are given by a black
box. He is very much aware that he is unable to make any kind of survey
of the totality of all inﬁnite sequences of natural numbers.
We suppose that some primitive recursive coding of ﬁnite sequences
of natural numbers has been deﬁned, that makes every natural number
code exactly one ﬁnite sequence of natural numbers. For every k in N, for
every ﬁnite sequence (n0, n1, . . . , nk−1) of natural numbers of length k,
we denote the number coding this ﬁnite sequence by 〈n0, n1, . . . , nk−1〉.
For every s, we let length(s) be the length of the ﬁnite sequence coded
by s. For every s, for every i < length(s), we let s(i) be the value of the
ﬁnite sequence coded by s at i. We let 〈 〉 denote the empty sequence,
the unique ﬁnite sequence of length 0.
We let ∗ denote the function corresponding to concatenation of ﬁnite
sequences: for all s, t in N, s ∗ t codes the ﬁnite sequence one obtains by
putting the ﬁnite sequence coded by t behind the ﬁnite sequence coded
by s.
For all s, t, we deﬁne: s is an initial part of t if and only if, for some
u, s ∗ u = t.
For all s, t, we deﬁne: s is the immediate shortening of t or: t is
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an immediate prolongation of s, if and only if there exists n such that
s ∗ 〈n〉 = t.
For every α, for every n, we deﬁne αn := 〈α(0), α(1), . . . , α(n− 1)〉.
For every α, for every s, we deﬁne: α passes through s, or: s is an
initial part of α, if and only if, for some n, s = αn.
For every s, we let N ∩ s be the set of all elements of N passing
through s.
Now let B be a subset of N. B is called a bar in N if and only if
every inﬁnite sequence α has an initial part in B.
More generally, let B be a subset of N and X a subset of N . B is
called a bar in X if and only if every inﬁnite sequence α in X has an
initial part in B.
Let s belong to N. We say: “B bars s”, or, in Brouwer’s words: “s is
securable with respect to B”, if and only if B is a bar in N∩s. S.C. Kleene,
in [Kleene 1965, 50], proposes to use the expression “securable (with
respect to B) in the explicit sense” for this notion.
Suppose that B is a subset of N and a bar in N . Brouwer reﬂected
on the question how one may be sure that B is indeed a bar in N .
Note that we must convince ourselves that for every possible inﬁnite
sequence we can effectively find an initial part in B. He came to the
following conclusion that we want to call Brouwer’s basic assumption or
Brouwer’s thesis on bars:
If B is a subset of N and a bar in N , there exist a proof with
the following properties:
(i) the conclusion of the proof is the statement: B bars 〈 〉,
(ii) the starting points of the proof are steps of the following
form, immediate conclusions from certain basic facts :
s belongs to B, therefore: B bars s, and
(iii) the proof uses only two kinds of reasoning steps:
the reasoning steps of the first kind are of the following
form:
B bars s ∗ 〈0〉, B bars s ∗ 〈1〉, B bars s ∗ 〈2〉, . . ., therefore: B
bars s, and
the reasoning steps of the second kind are of the follo-
wing form:
B bars s, therefore: B bars s ∗ 〈17〉.
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In reasoning steps of the second kind 17 of course may be replaced
by any other natural number. Note that reasoning steps of the ﬁrst kind
have inﬁnitely many premisses. The proof thus has inﬁnitary character,
and, as Brouwer emphasizes, one should not think of the proof as a
(ﬁnite) text on paper, but as a mental construction.
We shall call a proof with the above-mentioned properties a canonical
proof of the fact that B is a bar in N .
Brouwer seems to have been brought to his basic assumption by the
conviction that, somehow, the truth of the statement: “B is a bar in N ”
must be founded upon a well-ordered organization of the information
available in the form of basic facts. (Basic facts are statements of the
form: “s belongs to B”.)
What use does Brouwer make of his basic assumption? Pictorially
speaking, he takes the skeleton of the canonical proof, and employs it
as a structure on which to append other proofs, isomorphic to the given
one. Replacing the statements occurring in the canonical proof by other
statements, obeying the same logical dependencies, he obtains new proofs
and establishes new facts, as follows.
Suppose that B is a subset of N and a bar in N . Also assume
that Q is a subset of N with the following properties:
(i) B is a subset of Q,
(ii) for every s, if, for all n, s∗〈n〉 belongs to Q, then s belongs
to Q, and
(iii) for every s, if s belongs to Q, then, for all n, s ∗ 〈n〉
belongs to Q.
We may conclude: 〈 〉 belongs to Q.
The idea would be to replace, in a canonical proof of the fact that B
is a bar in N , every statement: “B bars s” by the statement: “s belongs to
Q”. The result would be another valid proof, this time with conclusion:
“〈 〉 belongs to Q”.
We may state Brouwer’s idea more succinctly, as follows.
Let Q be a subset of N. Q is called a monotone subset of N if and
only if, for each s, for each n, if s belongs to Q, then s ∗ 〈n〉 belongs to
Q. Q is called an inductive subset of N if and only if, for each s, if, for
each n, s ∗ 〈n〉 belongs to Q, then s belongs to Q.
Let us introduce, for every subset B of N, the set Sec(B) as the
least monotone and inductive set Q containing B, that is Sec(B) itself
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contains B and is monotone and inductive, and for every subset Q of N,
if Q contains B and is monotone and inductive, then Sec(B) is a subset
of Q.
Brouwer probably would not have accepted the impredicative des-
cription of Sec(B) we just gave as a deﬁnition, but, in an indirect way,
he obviously accepts the existence of such a set as it may be deﬁned as
the set of all s for which we have a canonical proof that B is a bar in
N ∩ s.
For practical purposes, therefore, Brouwer’s basic assumption may
be formulated as follows:
For every subset B of N, if B is a bar in N , then 〈 〉 belongs
to Sec(B).
Let us also introduce, for every subset B of N, the set Ind(B) as
the least inductive set containing B. We may accept this deﬁnition for
reasons similar to the ones that made us accept the deﬁnition of the set
Sec(B). Kleene, in [Kleene 1965, 50], uses the expression: “s is securable
(with respect to B) in the inductive sense” for: “s belongs to Ind(B)”.
Kleene did so because of Brouwer’s Footnote 7 in [Brouwer 1927]. As
will become clear in the sequel of this paper, it would perhaps have been
wiser to reserve the expression “s is securable (with respect to B) in the
inductive sense” for “s belongs to Sec(B)”.
We want to apply Brouwer’s idea and draw a conclusion from his basic
assumption. Our conclusion, however, is slightly diﬀerent from Brouwer’s
own ﬁrst conclusion.
We ﬁrst have to give some further deﬁnitions.
We let Cantor space C be the set of all sequences α in N that assume
no other value than 0 or 1.
For every α in C, we let Dα, the set decided by α, be the set of all n
in N such that α(n) = 1.
For every α in N , for every n, we let αn be the element of N satis-
fying: for each m, αn(m) = α(〈n〉 ∗m).
We let 0 be the element of N with the constant value 0.
We now introduce the set of stumps. We borrowed the word “stump”
from [Brouwer 1954] but are giving it a diﬀerent meaning. Stumps are
the characteristic functions of certain decidable subsets of N, that is,
they are elements of Cantor space C. We deﬁne the set of the stumps
inductively, as follows:
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(i) 0 is a stump. Note that 0 is the characteristic function of
the empty set. We sometimes call 0 the empty stump.
(ii) For every α in C, if α(〈 〉) = 1 and, for each n, αn is a
stump, then α is a stump.
(iii) Every stump is obtained from 0 by the repeated appli-
cation of (ii).
We shall use σ, τ, . . . as variables over stumps.
Note that we may decide, for every stump σ, if σ is the empty stump
or not.
For every non-empty stump σ, we call the stumps σ0, σ1, . . . the im-
mediate substumps of σ.
The following principle of induction on the set of stumps should be
accepted as an axiom, once one decides to admit the set of stumps as a
sensible totality:
Let P be a subset of the set of stumps. If the empty stump
belongs to P and every non-empty stump σ with the property
that each one of its immediate substumps σ0, σ1, . . . belongs
to P , belongs itself to P , then every stump belongs to P .
Note that this principle of induction may be read as an impredicative
characterization of the set of stumps: the set of stumps is the least subset
P of C such that 0 belongs to P and, for every α in C, if α(〈 〉) = 1 and,
for each n, αn belongs to P , then α belongs to P .
We let 1∗ be the element of C satisfying: for each s, 1∗(s) = 1 if and
only if s = 〈 〉. Note that 1∗ is a stump and that D1∗ = {〈 〉}.
For every subset X of N, for every s, we let s ∗ X be the set of all
numbers s ∗ t, where t belongs to X .
Note that, for every non-empty stump σ, Dσ = {〈 〉} ∪
⋃
n∈N
〈n〉 ∗Dσn .
One may prove the following facts by transﬁnite induction on the set
of stumps:
(i) For every stump σ, for every s, for every n, if σ(s∗〈n〉) = 1,
then σ(s) = 1.
(ii) For every stump σ, for every α, there exists n such that
σ(αn) = 0, that is, N \Dσ is a bar in N .
It is very useful, in the development of intuitionistic analysis, to have
stumps available. Brouwer seems to have hesitated to take the decision to
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accept the set of stumps, or some other set, given by a similar inductive
deﬁnition, as a sensible totality and to take the corresponding principle
of induction as an axiom, but, in fact, handling notions like “(inductively
constructed) well-ordered sets”, or “securable/versicherbar ” in [Brouwer
1927], he implicitly did so. The role of stumps in intuitionistic analysis is
comparable to the rôle fulﬁlled by countable ordinals in classical analysis.
The Second Axiom of Countable Choice, an axiom that we want to
use in the proof of the next theorem, is an accepted principle of intui-
tionistic mathematics, as it seems to follow naturally from the idea that
inﬁnite sequences of natural numbers are growing step by step. This
axiom claims:
For every subset R of N×N , if, for each n, there exists α such
that nRα, then there exists α such that, for each n, nRαn.
In the formal systems developed in [Kleene 1965] and [Howard 1966],
stumps do not occur. In these systems, a direct formulation of the follo-
wing theorem is impossible.
Theorem 1.1: (Improved Bar Theorem)
Let B be a subset of N and a bar in N .
There exists a stump σ such that B ∩Dσ is a bar in N .
Proof: Suppose that B is a subset of N and a bar in N . Let Q be the
set of all s in N such that, for some stump σ, for every α, there exists n
such that s ∗ αn has an initial part in B and αn belongs to Dσ.
Note that B is a subset of Q.
Note that Q is monotone: assume that s belongs to Q. Find a stump
σ such that, for every α, there exists n such that s ∗ αn belongs to B
and αn belongs to Dσ. Observe that σ(〈 〉) = 1, that is, σ is not the
empty stump. Let n be a natural number and consider σn. We have to
distinguish two cases.
Case (i). σn is the empty stump. Note that s itself has an initial part
in B. Recall that 1∗ is a stump and that D1∗ = {〈 〉}. Also note that,
for every α, there exists p such that s ∗ 〈n〉 ∗ αp has an initial part in B
and αp belongs to D1∗ .
Case (ii). σn is not the empty stump. Observe that, for every α, there
exists p such that s ∗ 〈n〉 ∗αp has an initial part in B and αp belongs to
Dσn .
Note that Q is inductive: assume that s belongs to N and, for each
n, s ∗ 〈n〉 belongs to Q. Using the Second Axiom of Countable Choice,
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we ﬁnd σ in C such that σ(〈 〉) = 1 and, for each n, σn is a stump, and
for every α, there exists p such that s ∗ 〈n〉 ∗ αp has an initial part in B
and αn belongs to Dσn . Note that σ is a stump and that, for every α,
there exists n such that s ∗ αn has an initial part in B and αn belongs
to Dσ.
Using Brouwer’s basic asumption, we conclude that 〈 〉 belongs to Q,
that is, there exists a stump σ such that B ∩Dσ is a bar in N . qed
Let σ be an element of C and a stump. We let σ′, the border of σ, be
the element of C such that σ′(〈 〉) = 1 if and only if σ = 0 and, for every
s, for every n, σ′(s ∗ 〈n〉) = 1 if and only if σ(s) = 1 and σ(s ∗ 〈n〉) = 0.
Note that Dσ′ consists of the numbers coding a ﬁnite sequence that
is just outside Dσ, that is, the sequence itself does not belong to Dσ, but
its immediate shortening does.
We may give the following inductive characterization of all elements
of C that are the border of a stump.
(i) 1∗ is the border of a stump. Note that 1∗ is the border of
0.
(ii) For every α in C, if α(〈 〉) = 0 and, for each n, αn is the
border of a stump, then α is the border of a stump.
(iii) Every element of C that is the border of a stump is
obtained from 1∗ by the repeated application of (ii).
Let X be a subset of N. We say that X coincides with the border of
a stump if and only if there exists a stump σ such that X = Dσ′ . We
say that X contains the border of a stump if and only if there exists a
stump σ such that Dσ′ is a subset of X .
Lemma 1.2: (On induction with respect to the border of a stump)
For every stump σ, the code number of the empty sequence, 〈 〉, belongs
to Ind(Dσ′), that is, 〈 〉 belongs to the least inductive set containing the
border of σ.
Proof: The proof is by straightforward transﬁnite induction on the
set of stumps and left to the reader. qed
Theorem 1.3: (On decidable and monotone bar induction)
Let B be a subset of N.
(i) For every stump σ, for every decidable subset B of N, if B ∩Dσ is a
bar in N , then the set of all s in B with the property that every proper
initial part of s does not belong to B coincides with the border of a stump.
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(ii) If B is a decidable subset of N and a bar in N , then 〈 〉 belongs to
Ind(B).
(iii) If B is a monotone subset of N and a bar in N , then 〈 〉 belongs to
Ind(B).
Proof: (i) is proved by transﬁnite induction on the set of stumps,
as follows. Clearly, the statement is true if σ is the empty stump. Now
assume that σ is a non-empty stump and that the statement holds for
every one of its immediate substumps σn. We distinguish two cases.
Case (1). 〈 〉 belongs to B. Note that the set of all s in B with
the property that every proper initial part of s does not belong to B
coincides with {〈 〉}, that is, with D1∗ .
Case (2). 〈 〉 does not belong to B. Using the induction hypothesis
we conclude that, for each n, the set of all s such that every proper
initial part of 〈n〉 ∗ s does not belong to B coincides with the border of a
stump. It follows that the set of all s in B with the property that every
proper initial part of s does not belong to B coincides with the border
of a stump.
(ii) follows from (i), Theorem 1.1 and Lemma 1.2.
(iii) Using Theorem 1.1, ﬁnd a stump σ such that B ∩ Dσ is a bar in
N . As B is monotone, the border Dσ′ of Dσ is a subset of B. Now use
Lemma 1.2. qed
We want to give a second proof of Theorem 1.1. We want to show
how one may avoid the use of the Second Axiom of Countable Choice,
using instead the weaker Second Axiom of Countable Unique Choice:
For every subset R of N×N , if, for each n, there exists exactly
one α such that nRα, then there exists α such that, for each
n, nRαn.
Let γ be an element of N . γ codes a continuous function from N
to N if and only if, for each α, for each n, there exists p such that
γ(〈n〉 ∗ αp) 6= 0.
Suppose that γ codes a continuous function from N to N . For every
α we let γ|α be the element β of N such that, for each n, there exists p
with the property γ(〈n〉∗αp) = β(n)+1 and, for all i < p, γ(〈n〉∗αi) = 0.
Lemma 1.4: (On defining functions on a stump by recursion)
For every stump σ, for every α, for every γ coding a continuous function
from N to N , there exists exactly one δ such that
(1) for every s in Dσ′ , δ
s = αs,
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(2) for every s in Dσ, there exists β with the property δ
s = γ|β and,
for each n, βn = δs∗〈n〉 and β(〈 〉) = 0, and
(3) for every s, if s does not belong to Dσ ∪ Dσ′ , then δs = 0, and
δ(〈 〉) = 0.
Proof: We use induction on the set of stumps. Note that the state-
ment holds for the empty stump. Assume that σ is a non-empty stump
and that the statement holds for every one of its immediate substumps
σn. Let γ, α belong to N and suppose that γ codes a continuous function
from N to N . Using the assumption, we conclude that, for every n, there
exists exactly one δ such that
(1) for every s in D(σn)′ , δs = α〈n〉∗s,
(2) for every s in Dσn , there exists β with the property δs = γ|β and,
for each p, βp = δs∗〈p〉 and β(〈 〉) = 0, and
(3) for every s, if s does not belong to Dσn ∪D(σn)′ , then δs = 0, and
δ(〈 〉) = 0.
Using the Second Axiom of Countable Unique Choice, conclude that
there exists exactly one ε in N such that, for each n,
(1) for every s in D(σn)′ , (εn)s = α〈n〉∗s,
(2) for every s in Dσn , there exists β with the property (εn)s = γ|β
and, for each p, βp = (εn)s∗〈p〉 and β(〈 〉) = 0, and
(3) for every s, if s does not belong to Dσn ∪ D(σn)′ , then (εn)s = 0,
and εn(〈 〉) = 0.
(4) ε(〈 〉) = 0.
We now let δ be the element of N satisfying
(1) for every s in D(σ)′ , δs = αs,
(2) for every n, for every s, if 〈n〉∗s belongs to Dσ, then δ〈n〉∗s = (εn)s,
and there exists β such that δ〈 〉 = γ|β, and, for each n, βn = (εn)〈 〉
and β(〈 〉) = 0, and
(3) for every s, if s does not belong to Dσ ∪ Dσ′ , then δs = 0, and
δ(〈 〉) = 0.
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It is easily seen that δ is the unique element of N satisfying the require-
ments. qed
We now formulate Brouwer’s basic assumption more explicitly, by
introducing canonical proofs as objects, in the following way.
Let B be a subset of N. Let σ be a stump and let γ be an element of
N . We say that the pair (σ, γ) is a canonical proof of the fact that B is
a bar if and only if the following conditions are fulﬁlled:
(i) γ(〈 〉) = 〈 〉,
(ii) for every s, if s belongs to Dσ′ , then γ(s) belongs to B,
and
(iii) for every s, either: for every n, γ(s ∗ 〈n〉) = γ(s) ∗ 〈n〉,
or: γ(s) has positive length and, for every n, γ(s ∗ 〈n〉) is
the immediate shortening of s.
Alternative proof of Theorem 1.1: Let B be a subset of N and a bar
in N . Find a stump σ and a sequence γ such that (σ, γ) is a canonical
proof of the fact that B is a bar. Using Lemma 1.4 we ﬁnd δ in N such
that (1) for every s in Dσ′ , δs = 1∗, and (2) for every s in Dσ, for all n,
if γ(s) = γ(s ∗ 〈0〉) ∗ 〈n〉, then either (δs∗〈0〉)n is the empty stump and
δs = 1∗, or (δs∗〈0〉)n is not the empty stump and δs = (δs∗〈0〉)n, and (3)
for every s in Dσ, if γ(s ∗ 〈0〉) = γ(s) ∗ 〈0〉, then δs(〈 〉) = 1 and, for each
n, (δs)n = δs∗〈n〉.
Let Q be the set of all s such that, if s belongs to Dσ ∪Dσ′ , then δs
is a stump and, for every α, there exists n such that γ(s) ∗ αn has an
initial part in B and αn belongs to Dδs . Note that Q is inductive and
contains Dσ′ . By Lemma 1.2, it follows that 〈 〉 belongs to Q, that is,
B ∩Dδ〈 〉 is a bar in N . qed
For every subset B of N, we let Mon(B) the set of all s in N such
that some initial part of s belongs to B.
The following theorem has been added upon a suggestion by the referee.
Theorem 1.5:
(i) For every subset B of N, the sets Sec(B) and Ind(Mon(B)) coincide.
(ii) For every monotone subset B of N, the sets Sec(B) and Ind(B)
coincide.
(iii) (E. Martino, P. Giaretta, see [Martino 1981]) Brouwer’s basic as-
sumption, that is, the statement: “For every subset B of N, if B is a
bar in N , then 〈 〉 belongs to Sec(B)” is equivalent to the principle of
Monotone Bar Induction, that is, the statement: “For every monotone
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subset B of N, if B is a bar in N , then 〈 〉 belongs to Ind(B)”.
(iv) For every decidable subset B of N, the sets Sec(B) and Ind(B) coin-
cide.
Proof: (i) Let B be a subset of N.
As Sec(B) is inductive and contains Mon(B), and Ind(Mon(B)) is the
least inductive subset of N containing Mon(B), the set Ind(Mon(B)) is
a subset of the set Sec(B).
As to the converse, we claim that Ind(Mon(B)) is not only inductive
but also monotone. In order to see this, let C be the set of all s in
N such that, for every t, if s is an initial part of t, then t belongs to
Ind(Mon(B)). Note that C contains Mon(B) and is inductive and mo-
notone, therefore Ind(Mon(B)) is a subset of C. It follows that the sets
C and Ind(Mon(B)) coincide, and that Ind(Mon(B)) is both inductive
and monotone. Therefore, Sec(B) is a subset of Ind(Mon(B)).
(ii) and (iii) are easy consequences of (i).
(iv) Let B be a decidable subset of N. Let C be the set of all s in Ind(B)
such that either s belongs to Mon(B) or for all n, s ∗ 〈n〉 belongs to
Ind(B). Note that C is inductive. (If s belongs to N, and, for all n,
s ∗ 〈n〉 belongs to C, then we may decide: either s belongs to Mon(B)
or, for all n, either s ∗ 〈n〉 belongs to B, or s ∗ 〈n〉 belongs to Ind(B),
therefore, for all n, s ∗ 〈n〉 belongs to Ind(B), and s itself belongs to
Ind(B).) As C contains B, and Ind(B) is the least inductive set con-
taining B, the sets Ind(B) and C coincide. Now observe that C is also
monotone. Therefore, as Sec(B) is the least monotone and inductive set
containing B, Sec(B) is a subset of C = Ind(B). As Sec(B) is inductive,
the converse is also true. qed
Note that Theorem 1.5(ii) and (iv) oﬀer an alternative proof of Theo-
rem 1.3 (iii) and (ii).
Corollary 1.6:
Let B be a subset of N and a bar in N . There exists a canonical proof
of the fact that B is a bar in N with the property that the conclusion
of a reasoning step of the first kind never functions as the premiss of a
reasoning step of the second kind.
Proof: Let B be a subset of N and a bar in N . Find a stump σ
such that Dσ ∩ B is a bar in N . Now construct a canonical proof that
ﬁrst proves, for every s in the border Dσ′ of Dσ, that s is securable with
respect to B, and then concludes, using these facts as starting points and
only reasoning steps of the ﬁrst kind that 〈 〉 is securable with respect
to B.
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One may also argue as follows. If B is a bar in N , then 〈 〉 belongs to
Sec(B) and thus, according to Theorem 1.5, to Ind(Mon(B)). qed
We might call a canonical proof with the property mentioned in Co-
rollary 1.6 a normal canonical proof.
Let γ belong to N . We let Eγ , the set enumerated by γ, be the set of
all m in N such that, for some n, γ(n) = m+ 1.
Let A be a subset of N. A is called enumerable if and only if, for some
γ, A coincides with Eγ .
The First Axiom of Countable Choice is a consequence of the Second
Axiom of Countable Choice, and claims:
For every subset R of N × N, if, for each n, there exists m
such that nRm, then there exists α such that, for each n,
nRα(n).
Note that, in a constructive context, this axiom is less evident than
in a classical context. We can not define α(n) as “the least m such that
nRm” as, sometimes, we are unable to decide if nR0 is true or not.
Corollary 1.7:
Every bar in N contains an enumerable subbar.
Proof: Let B be a bar in N . Using Theorem 1.1, ﬁnd a stump σ such
that B ∩Dσ is a bar in N . Using the First Axiom of Countable Choice,
ﬁnd α such that, for each s, if s does not belong to Dσ′ , then α(s) = 0,
and, if s does belong to Dσ′ , then there exists t in B such that t is an
initial part of s and α(s) = t+ 1. Clearly, Eα is a subset of B and a bar
in N . qed
It is not true that every bar in N contains a decidable subbar, alt-
hough Brouwer seems to have thought so, see Section 2.
2 Brouwer’s Bar Theorem and Kleene’s
Counterexample
Intent upon proving his Uniform Continuity Theorem, Brouwer came to
assert the following, see [Brouwer 1924], Theorem 1:
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Let R be a subset of N × N. Suppose I am able to ﬁnd, for
every α in N , a natural number n such that αRn, that is,
such that (α, n) belongs to R.
If I am really able to do so, there must exist a subset B of N
such that:
(i) B is a decidable subset of N,
(ii) every s in B is of sufficient information with respect to R,
that is, there exists n such that for every α passing through
s, αRn,
(iii) B is a bar in N , and
(iv) B is well-ordered, that is, if we translate Brouwer’s ter-
minology into the terminology used in Section 1: B is the
border of a stump.
A ﬁnite sequence should be seen as the beginning of an inﬁnite se-
quence that is created step-by-step. If the code number of a ﬁnite se-
quence belongs to B, then the ﬁnite sequence contains suﬃcient infor-
mation for determining a natural number that will suit every inﬁnite
sequence that is continuation of this ﬁnite beginning. Apparently, it is
important one realizes that every inﬁnite sequence, also an algorithmical-
ly given sequence, might be the result of a free step-by-step-construction.
Brouwer proves his assertion in two steps:
Step (1). There exist a subset B of N with the properties (i),
(ii), (iii). This statement has become known as Brouwer’s
principle for numbers, in [Kleene 1965], or the strong axiom
of continuity, in [Howard 1966], or the First Axiom of Con-
tinuous Choice, in [Veldman 2001b].
Step (2). Every subset B of N satisfying (iii) (or should we
understand: satisfying (iii) and (i)?) contains the border of
a stump.
Note that Theorem 1.3 implies that every set satisfying (i) and (iii)
contains a set satisfying (i), (iii) and (iv).
It has been rightly emphasized by Mark van Atten, see [Atten 2004],
that Brouwer, in [Brouwer 1924] and [Brouwer 1927], although dealing
with a bar that he assumes to be decidable, does not make it clear
where he uses this condition in his argument. In [Brouwer 1924] he seems
to argue that reasoning steps of the second kind may be eliminated
from the canonical proof, and indeed, in [Brouwer 1992], page 144, he
explicitly says so. In [Brouwer 1927] he has a longer argument, using
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a more complicated terminology, but, at none of these places, he ever
makes an appeal to the fact that B is a decidable subset of N. Brouwer
therefore may be suspected of believing that every set satisfying (iii) will
have a subset satisfying (i), (iii) and (iv). And indeed, in [Brouwer 1954]
and [Brouwer 1981], he explicitly claims, in his bar theorem, that every
bar contains the border of a stump. Unfortunately, this is false, as has
been observed by S.C. Kleene.
Theorem 2.1: (Kleene’s counterexample)
There exists an enumerable subset B of N such that:
(i) B is a bar in N ,
(ii) we can not prove that there is a decidable subset C of N that is a
subset of B and a bar in N ,
(iii) we can not prove that B contains the border of a stump, and
(iv) we can not prove that 〈 〉 belongs to Ind(B).
Proof: Let d be the decimal expansion of π. Let B be the set of all s
such that, either, there exists n such that s = 〈n〉 and there is no i ≤ n
such that for all j < 99, d(i+ j) = 9, or s = 〈 〉 and there exists i such
that for all j < 99, d(i+ j) = 9.
Let γ be an element of N such that for each n, if there is no i ≤ n such
that for all j < 99, d(i+ j) = 9, then γ(n) = 〈n〉+ 1 and, if there exists
i such that for all j < 99, d(i+ j) = 9, then γ(n) = 〈 〉+ 1. Note that B
coincides with Eγ , and thus is an enumerable subset of N.
(i) B is a bar in N : for every α, either there is no i ≤ α(0) such that for
all j < 99, d(i + j) = 9, and 〈α(0)〉 belongs to B, or there exists such i
and α0 = 〈 〉 belongs to B.
(ii) Assume that C is a decidable subset of N and a subset of B and a
bar in N . We may distinguish two cases.
Case (i). 〈 〉 belongs to C. Then 〈 〉 also belongs to B and there exists
i such that for all j < 99, d(i+ j) = 9.
Case (ii). 〈 〉 does not belong to C. Then, for each n, 〈n〉 belongs
to C, and therefore to B, and there is no i such that for all j < 99,
d(i+ j) = 9.
In both cases, we end up with a statement for which we have no
proof.
(iii) Note that every border of a stump is a decidable subset of N and a
bar in N and use (ii).
(iv) Let Q be the set of all s such that, either, there exists n such that
s = 〈n〉 and there is no i ≤ n such that for all j < 99, d(i + j) = 9, or
s = 〈 〉 and either there exists i such that for all j < 99, d(i+ j) = 9, or
there is no such i.
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Q is an inductive set containing B but we have no proof that 〈 〉
belongs to Q as the statement: “〈 〉 belongs to Q” is equivalent to the
statement: “either there exists i such that for all j < 99, d(i+ j) = 9, or
there is no such i.” qed
Generalizing the example given in the proof of Theorem 2.1, we see
that the bar theorem, as formulated by Brouwer, entails the so-called
limited principle of omniscience:
For all α, either there exists i such that α(i) 6= 0 or, for all
i, α(i) = 0.
It is well-known that the limited principle of omniscience, together with
Brouwer’s Continuity Principle, leads to a contradiction, see [Veldman
2001a], or [Kleene 1965, 87 (Theorem ∗27.23)].
Faced with Brouwer’s apparent mistake, Kleene, in [Kleene 1965],
decided to believe Brouwer’s argument only for effective, decidable bars.
He thus obtains the principle of induction on decidable bars, and derives
the principle of induction on monotone bars by an application of Brou-
wer’s principle for numbers, that is, the strong axiom of continuity or
First Axiom of Continuous Choice mentioned before.
As appears from Section 1, and, indeed, already from [Martino 1981],
it is possible to argue the plausibility of the principle of induction on mo-
notone bars without invoking this axiom. This may be of some importan-
ce, also because of the fact that the continuity principles ﬂatly contradict
classical mathematics, and the principle of induction on monotone bars
does not.
The view on Brouwer’s Thesis on bars sketched in Section 1 has been
advocated in [Veldman 1981] and [Veldman 1985].
Kleene’s example does not refute Brouwer’s basic assumption. Alt-
hough Brouwer has been a bit clumsy in his attempts to exploit his basic
assumption, this basic assumption remains, as Michael Dummett says,
in [Dummett 2000], of great interest, not only from the philosophical,
but also, as we want to explain in the next Section, from the mathema-
tical point of view. We should observe here that Brouwer’s mistake has
brought Dummett into great trouble. In the ﬁrst edition of [Dummett
2000] he made an attempt to explain the mistake which subsequently
was shown to be unsuccessful in [Martino 1981]. In the second edition of
[Dummett 2000], the necessary improvements have been made.
We also have to observe that the discussion of the bar theorem in the
existing literature, for instance, in [Dalen 1999, 380 ﬀ.], or in [Troelstra
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1988], chapter IV, Section 8, or in [Atten 2004], Chapter 4, is, from the
perspective sketched in this paper, not completely satisfying.
3 Some Applications
Brouwer’s Thesis on bars has many applications in intuitionistic analysis,
see [Veldman In-prep.]. We mention some examples.
(i) The Fan Theorem
A subset X of N is a fan or a finitary spread if and only if there
exists β in C such that (i) for every s, β(s) = 1 if and only if, for some n,
β(s∗〈n〉) = 1, and (ii) for every α, α belongs to X if and only if, for all n,
β(αn) = 1, and (iii) for every s, the set of all n such that β(s ∗ 〈n〉) = 1
is ﬁnite.
The Fan Theorem is the statement:
For every subset F of N , for every subset B of N, if F is a
fan and B is a bar in F , then there exists a finite subset B′
of B that is a bar in F .
This is the so-called unextended Fan Theorem, Brouwer’s ﬁrst and
only application of his bar theorem. In [Brouwer 1924], Brouwer is com-
bining this result with the Second Axiom of Continuous Choice and he
obtains a more general statement, the Extended Fan Theorem.
Our version does not put any restriction on the bar B. Kleene derives
the case that B is a decidable subset of N from his principle of induction
on decidable bars. He then has to apply a strong axiom of continuity in
order to derive the unrestricted case from the decidable case.
Brouwer uses the Fan Theorem in order to prove that every conti-
nuous function from [0, 1] to R is uniformly continuous. More information
on the Fan Theorem may be found in [Veldman 2005b].
(ii) The Almost-Fan-Theorem
A decidable subset A of N is called almost-finite if and only if, for
every strictly increasing sequence in N there exists n such that γ(n)
does not belong to A. Brouwer’s Thesis plays a rôle in the study of this
notion, see [Veldman 2005a].
A subset X of N is an almost-fan or an almost-finitary spread if and
only if there exists β in C such that (i) for every s, β(s) = 1 if and only
if, for some n, β(s ∗ 〈n〉) = 1, and (ii) for every α, α belongs to X if and
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only if, for all n, β(αn) = 1, and (iii) for every s, the set of all n such
that β(s ∗ 〈n〉) = 1 is almost-ﬁnite.
The Almost-Fan-Theorem is the statement:
For every subset F of N , for every subset B of N, if F is an
almost-fan and B is a bar in F , then there exists an almost-
finite subset B′ of B that is a bar in F .
The Almost-Fan-Theorem implies the Fan Theorem and seems to be a
stronger statement, see [Veldman 2001c], [Veldman 2001d] and [Veldman
2005b].
(iii) A characterization of the well-founded enumerable subsets of the
set Q of the rational numbers.
Let Q be the set of the rational numbers and let < denote the usual
ordering.
For all subsets X,Y of Q, we deﬁne: X < Y if and only if, for all p
in X , for all q in Y , p < q.
We deﬁne the class of EWO of the explicitly well-ordered subsets of
Q by means of the following inductive deﬁnition:
(i) The empty set ∅ belongs to EWO and, for every p in Q,
the singleton {p} belongs to EWO.
(ii) For every sequence X0, X1, X2, . . . of subsets of Q, if, for
each n, Xn < Xn+1 and Xn belongs to EWO, then
⋃
n∈N
Xn
belongs to EWO.
(iii) Every element of EWO is obtained from sets mentio-
ned under (i) by the repeated application of the operation
mentioned under (ii).
Using Brouwer’s Thesis on bars one may prove, see [Veldman In-prep.],
For every enumerable subset A of Q the following two state-
ments are equivalent:
(i) For every function γ from N to A there exists n such that
γ(n) ≤ γ(n+ 1).
(ii) A belongs to EWO.
(iv) Some results in intuitionistic descriptive set theory.
A subset X of Baire space N is called positively Borel if it may be
obtained from basic open subsets of N by means of the operations of
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countable union and countable intersection. A subset X of Baire space
N is called strictly analytic if and only if there is a continuous function
φ from N to N such that X coincides with the range of φ. A subset X
of N is co-analytic if and only if there is an open subset Y of N with
the property that X is the set of all α such that, for all β, 〈α, β〉 belongs
to Y . Here 〈 〉 denotes a continuous one-to-one mapping of N × N onto
N. Using Brouwer’s Thesis one may prove intuitionistic versions of some
famous classical results, see [Lusin 1972], [Moschovakis 1980], [Kechris
1996], [Veldman 1981], and [Veldman 2001b].
(i) Suslin’s Theorem: every subset of N that is both strictly
analytic and co-analytic is positively Borel.
(ii) The Lusin Separation Theorem: if X, Y are strictly ana-
lytic subsets of N such that every member of X is apart from
every member of Y , then there are positively Borel subsets
A,B of N such that every member of A is apart from every
member of B, and X is a subset of A and Y is a subset of
B.
(iii) Every subset of N that is the range of a strictly one-to-
one continuous function from N to N is positively Borel.
A constructive version of the Lusin separation theorem is also studied
in [Aczel To appear]. The importance of Brouwer’s thinking on bars for
some developments in (classical) descriptive set theory has been empha-
sized by Charles Parsons, see [Parsons 1967].
(v) Some Combinatorial Theorems.
Using Brouwer’s Thesis one may prove intuitionistic versions of the
Inﬁnite Ramsey Theorem, and of Kruskal’s Theorem, see [Veldman 1993]
and [Veldman 2004].
Acknowledgement
I thank the referee of the paper for making a number of useful obser-
vations and for providing the reference to [Martino 1981]. His or her
comments have led to substantial improvements.
40 Wim Veldman
References
Aczel, P.
To appear A Constructive Version of the Lusin Separation Theo-
rem, to appear in S. Lindström, E. Palmgren, K. Segerberg,
V. Stoltenberg-Hansen (ed.), Logicism, Intuitionism, and Forma-
lism: — what has become of them?
Atten, M. van
2004 On Brouwer, in: Wadsworth Philosophers Series, Thomson Lear-
ning, London etc.
Brouwer, L. E. J.
1924 Beweis dass jede volle Funktion gleichmässig stetig ist, Ko-
ninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen Verslagen 27,
189–193, 1924, also in [Brouwer 1975, 286–290].
Brouwer, L. E. J.
1927 Über Deﬁnitionsbereiche von Funktionen, Math. Annalen 97,
60–75, 1927, also in [Brouwer 1975, 390–405], see also [Heijenoort
1967, 446–463].
Brouwer, L. E. J.
1954 Points and Spaces, Canad. J. Math. 6, 1–17, 1954, also in [Brou-
wer 1975, 522–538].
Brouwer, L. E. J.
1975 Collected Works, Vol. I: Philosophy and Foundations of Mathe-
matics, A. Heyting (ed.), Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Brouwer, L. E. J.
1981 Brouwer’s Cambridge Lectures on Intuitionism, D. Van Dalen
(ed.), Cambridge: the University Press.
Brouwer, L. E. J.
1992 Intuitionismus, herausgegeben, eingeleitet und kommentiert von
D. van Dalen, Wissenschaftsverlag, Mannheim etc.
Dalen, D. van
1999 Mystic, Geometer, and Intuitionist, the Life of L.E.J. Brouwer,
Volume I, the Dawning Revolution, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Brouwer’s Real Thesis on Bars 41
Dummett, M.
2000 Elements of Intuitionism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977,
Second Edition.
Heijenoort, J. van
1967 From Frege to Gödel, A Source Book in Mathematical Logic,
1879-1931, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
Howard, W.A. & Kreisel, G.
1966 Transﬁnite Induction and Bar Induction of Types Zero and
One, and the Role of Continuity in Intuitionistic Analysis, Journ.
Symb. Logic 31, 325–358.
Kechris, A.S.
1996 Classical Descriptive Set Theory, Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
Kleene, S. C. & Vesley, R. E.
1965 The Foundations of Intuitionistic Mathematics, Especially in
Relation to Recursive Functions, Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Lusin, N.
1972 Leçons sur les ensembles analytiques et leurs applications, Pa-
ris, 1930, second edition, New York: Chelsea Publishing Company.
Martino, E. & Giaretta, P.
1981 Brouwer, Dummett and the Bar Theorem, in Atti del Congresso
nazionale di logica, Montecatini Terme, 1-5 ottobre 1979, a cura di
Sergio Bernini, Bibliopolis, Napoli, 541–558.
Moschovakis, Y. N.
1980 Descriptive Set Theory, Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Parsons, C.
1967 Introduction to [Brouwer 1927], see [Heijenoort 1967, 457–459].
Troelstra, A. S. & van Dalen, D.
1988 Constructivism in Mathematics, an Introduction, Volume I,
Amsterdam: North-Holland Publ. Co.
Veldman, W.
1981 Investigations in Intuitionistic Hierarchy Theory, Ph.D. Thesis,
Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen.
42
Veldman, W.
1985 Intuïtionistische Wiskunde, Lecture Notes in Dutch, Depart-
ment of Mathematics, Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen.
2001a Understanding and Using Brouwer’s Continuity Principle, in
U. Berger, H. Osswald & P. Schuster (eds.), Reuniting the An-
tipodes, Constructive and Nonstandard Views of the Continuum,
Proceedings of a Symposium held in San Servolo/Venice, 1999,
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 285–302.
2001b The Borel Hierarchy and the Projective Hierarchy in Intuitio-
nistic Mathematics, Report No. 0103, Department of Mathematics,
University of Nijmegen.
2001c Bijna de waaierstelling, Nieuw Archief voor Wiskunde, vijfde
serie, deel 2, 330-339.
2001d Almost the Fan Theorem, Report No. 0113, Department of
Mathematics, University of Nijmegen.
2004 An Intuitionistic Proof of Kruskal’s Theorem, Arch. Math. Lo-
gic 43, 215–264.
2005a Two Simple Sets that are not Positively Borel, Annals of Pure
and Applied Logic 135, 151–209.
2005b The Fan Theorem as an Axiom and as a Contrast to Klee-
ne’s Alternative, Report No. 0509, Department of Mathematics,
Radboud University Nijmegen.
In-prep. Some Applications of Brouwer’s Thesis on Bars, in prepa-
ration.
Veldman, W., Bezem, M.
1993 Ramsey’s Theorem and the Pigeonhole Principle in Intuitioni-
stic Mathematics, J. London Math. Soc. 47, 193–211.
